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It has been proposed that there is, or that we 
should assume there to be, such a thing as na classical 
conception of the subject," and in the same breath, 
that we should reject it. This subject has been 
conceived as essentially unified, and as substantial. 
The latter property is now the less defended, and prob-
ably the less defensible, and it is therefore on the 
unity of the subject that "non-classical" expositions 
of the subject come to focus. My concern here will be 
to look at various ways in which the subject has been 
split and to ask on what conditions a truly split sub-
ject may be conceived. 
First of all I offer a brief, but necessary, 
resume of the textual and historical meanderings of my 
subject. 
It is not until Sartre that the Cartesian subject 
may really be said to have returned from its ex-
periences at the hands of German idealism. We can, I 
suggest, see Sartre as attempting in Being and Nothing-
ness to re-perform Descartes' act of self-cognition 
and, due to centuries' accumulation of self-knowledge, 
as unable to successfully perform it. It is, however, 
necessary for Sartre that there be an attempt to per-
form it—its failure does not lead to the desertion of 
the first-person standpoint. It is the project of com-
pleting the Cogito that then becomes imperative—the 
cogito remains present as if a ghost, figured in the 
nature of desire. 
The reasons for the collapse of the Cogito across 
time are obviously enormously complex, but I hope that 
at least some of the following will be agreed to be of 
central importance. The attack on rational psychology 
in Kant's Paralogisms; the restoration of intentional-
ity to consciousness in Brentano and Husserl; the meta-
morphosis of consciousness into Dasein. Even at this 
stage of the subject's history, we still have an ap-
proximately classical subject. Kant exorcises sub-
stratum rather than substance from the " subject. 
Heidegger perhaps only blurs our understanding of the 
relation between self and consciousness. Insofar as 
unity suffices for substantiality, a unity of appercep-
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tion or a unity of Sorge is still the unity of a 
substance.1 And so it is, I suggest, altogether 
another set of texts that does the work for Sartre: 
the attention to the fine grain of selfhood in 
Kierkegaard, Freud, Nietzsche and Jaspers. It is with 
the aid of these writers that Sartre undoes the on-
tological solidity of the subject. 
Sartre*8 dualism is of a special kind and it is one 
that most brilliantly complements the kind of splitting 
that Sartre found in Kierkegaard!an double-mindedness 
and in the states of abnormal psychology. Crucially, 
the dualism of Sartre's phenomenological ontology. 
Crucially, the dualism of Sartre's phenomenological on-
tology is actually incorporated within the subject, and 
it is this that puts an end to the security of 
Descartes' Cogito as an archimedean point. The "I" of 
the Cogito can no longer appropriate one part of a di-
vided domain as its own. It can no longer identify 
unequivocally with the realm of the unextended, as a 
saturated region that it itself truly "is." The mental 
is in a sense no longer a home. 
In this way Sartre can take over Heidegger's lan-
guage of man's "being outside himself," and in The 
Transcendence of the Ego he can argue that the self is 
both an intimate product of the workings of reflexivity 
and that it is an entirely objective and public content 
of the world. Sartre's subject is made in self-
consciousness, but it is therein discovered as more 
worldly than either Descartes or Kant conceived it. 
The classical subject has by now lost both substance 
and center. 
Being and Nothingness builds up multiple pairs of 
terms, ranging from basic temporal pairs (present/past, 
past/future), Hegelian modalities (in-itself/for-it-
self), contrasts in the language of classical phenomen-
ology (thetic/non-thetic, positional/non-positional), 
to Sartre's major oppositions of reflective and pre-
reflective and of facticity and transcendence. The 
text moves around these polarities, assembling, align-
ing and then disassembling them. Never are they col-
lapsed into one another, and it is by this textual 
measure2 that Sartre is able to grasp, within a co-
herent theory, the discrepancies within the subject. 
So, Sartre has one term of the relation, "man-
world," absorb the force of that very contrast and ex-
perience it as its own division. Sartre is a Cartesian 
in denying the positivist thesis that science can elab-
orate the necessary single concept in terms of which 
human identity can be represented, and in making re-
flexivity central; but the Cartesian Cogito is rele-
gated to the status of a project. 
We come now to Lacan. Here, Freud is raised to a 
fully conceptual plane. If we think of how philosophy 
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usually responds to psychoanalytic theory, Lacan's work 
will appear all the more extraordinary. The orthodox 
way of "taking" Freud, in analytic philosophy of mind 
and in philosophy of science, is something like this: 
we argue over whether or not a concept of selfhood that 
has its basis in consciousness can be stretched to 
cover the unconscious as Freud describes it, and we at-
tempt to see how much mentality can survive the loss of 
the property "potential object of consciousness." And 
something not unlike this is, of course, also Sartre's 
proceedure. 
How can it be that an empirical theory can effect a 
juncture with pure thought, and in such a way as to 
disturb it? The Lacanian answer here will be that in 
Freud's texts and in the "psychoanalytic experience" we 
uncover a split in the subject that is not simply the 
discovery of new facts describable in the old ways, or 
merely a new theory for old facts. It aspires to be an 
event of the order of the Cogito itself, a "philosophi-
cal" event, and we must be wary not to misunderstand 
it. 
Before proceeding with Lacan, I digress to produce 
an argument, in part borrowed from the literature of 
analytic philosophy, that will point up a highly impor-
tant feature of Freudian metapsychology. 
Suppose we begin (I) with the retort that the split 
in the subject located by Freud can not be of philo-
sophical interest, because it is only a division in the 
multiplcity of belief-states and desire-states of the 
person or organism, and it therefore can not impinge 
upon that foundational unity, the Cogito, which is a 
unity of apperception. 
From this it would follow that (2) there is a line 
to be drawn between the person, that can fail of unity, 
and the cogito or subject, that can not. 
Having made this distinction we will be led 
straight to (3) the undoing of that second element, the 
subject: we will be led to deny, when we think about 
conditions of identity, that there can be any reference 
to an entity that can only preserve its unity by part-
ing company with an empirical self whose nature is then 
yielded up to the natural sciences. 
Let us take another look at what happens in this 
positivist line of thought. We are left with a psycho-
analytically describable entity, one for which we can 
construct psychic topographies, but one without any-
thing truly recognizable as internal division. To ex-
plain, in pressing home the split in the subject, we 
eliminated the Cogito. But this left us with only a 
system of belief-states and desire-states capable of 
various degrees of integration and disintegration. We 
can no longer raise the question of reflexive unity--
that unity I "take myself to have"--and we can no 
longer predicate it or its contrary of the person. 
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Freudian psychology melts into functionalist theory of the mind. 
The arguments that complete this "elimination of 
consciousness" derive in part from analytic philoso-
phy's readings of the Philosophical Investigations and 
in part from theoretical reflection on cognitive 
science.1 Its relevance to Lacan lies in its showing 
just how precarious consciousness becomes in any theory 
that starts from features of the subject's ititernal 
division. I will later hint at an analogy between a 
world of material states and a world of signs, and sug-
gest that the above could be rewritten substituting 
'signifier* for 'mental state'. 
Consciousness, let alone self-consciousness, has in 
psychoanalysis always been on the verge of shrinking to 
mere perceptual registration, and thus constituted an 
embarassment for Freud himself, whose remarks on the 
question are highly contradictory.4 I suggest that in 
restoring the unconscious to its rightful place and in 
overturning ego-psychology, the shallow Anglo-American 
psychoanalysts' readings of Freud, Lacan has had to 
fall prey to this danger, and can not prevent the di-
vided subject from being absorbed back into nature and 
thereby regaining a sort of wholeness. This result is 
perhaps less surprising when we recall how much struc-
turalism there is in Lacan and the drive in structural-
ism to "translate culture back into nature."* 
• To elaborate Lacan further we must, at least for 
purposes of presentation, turn to Derrida. The reason 
for this is that the meaning of the Saussurean "split" 
S/s, which is the split elided by Lacan with the 
Freudian division, is only clearly developed in 
Derrida. This should not be taken to imply that there 
is only agreement between Lacan and Derrida; it is only 
to say that I do not find enough in Lacan's texts to 
make his use of S/s comprehensible without thinking of 
it as sufficiently similar to differance itself so as 
to be elaborated by it. 
In his critique of Husserl,6 Derrida argues firstly 
against unmediated self-knowledge, and secondly from 
the nature of the sign to the nature of the mediation. 
The role of S/s comes in the second part of the 
argument--if something arbitrary, in the special dif-
ferential sense, effects self-knowledge, then self-
knowledge becomes something very hard to conceive. At 
least, we can no longer claim to fill the concept of 
self-knowledge with our experience of self-presence. 
And we are challenged to show how we understand it at 
all. 
I restate the argument: (1) self-knowledge 
requires self-representation and is not made possible 
by self-presence; (2) there is then only self-presence 
within the constraints of representation, and represen-
tation is infected by S/s/differance; (3) the subject's 
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self-representation is especially "weak," for the sub-
ject is bound up in representation in a way that other 
items in the world can not be. As with Sartre, the 
subject comes out as the least solid of all things 7—a 
kind of inverted privilege. 
Returning to Lacan, the split in the bar of S/s is 
used to geneiate the various divisions of Cs./Ucs., 
self-Other, self/other, the knot of the Oedipal com-
plex, and the patterns of "choice" ("money-or-your-
life") that underlie desire and its distinctness from 
demand. In short, psychoanalytic theory is reformu-
lated in terms of differance. 
What is of great interest, when we reflect on how 
and where splits have been inserted in the subject, is 
the way in which the formal subject-eliminating argu-
ment I gave above has been as if enacted by the com-
pound of Lacan-Derrida. In the second stage of that 
argument (2), experiential subject and psychic individ-
ual were divided: which is of course what happens when 
Lacan deploys the S/s to effect the division between 
consciousness and unconsciousness, Cs. and lies. In the 
third stage (3), one of these terms was abolished. And 
it is precisely in Derrida*s analysis of the subject of 
the phenomenologists that this is repeated—we are 
driven to renounce the subject altogether. One appli-
cation of the S/s separates subjectivity from the self; 
another eliminates that residual subjectivity altoge-
ther. 
And so, I contend, to re-examine the Lacanian split 
in the subject is to find it dependent on a Derridaean 
"metaphysic," and it is therefore to require the itera-
tion of S/s, and the elimination of subjectivity. The 
attack on the classical subject yields not a split sub-
ject, but no subject at all. Ironically, the dissolu-
tion of the subject leaves us with precisely that 
conception of the person employed in analytic philoso-
phy of mind. 
The texts of Lacan-Derrida must therefore retain 
enough of the Cogito to prevent such a slide. And both 
are aware of this; but whether they have any right to 
retain any of "the Cogito is something I hope to have 
made dubious. 
Derrida's "position" is, as it should be, hard to 
make out. On the one hand we have the explicit state-
ments that there "is no perception," and in Speech and 
Phenomena the argument that without presence, we simply 
have no notion of consciousness. Yet in writing less 
expository texts, on madness and the cogito. the Cogito 
is accorded notional supremacy and monopoly on Reason, 
and eroded in more strategic manner.' 
Lacan's double-game on this matter can be illus-
trated by a little stylistic analysis. If we examine, 
"I am not, wherever I am the playing of my thought," we 
find a rhetoric that procures identification of the 
reader with the cogito, and effectively encourages it--
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in order to then break it. As I read, I lose self-
identity: from being identified with the first in-
stance of n I , " I am forced to then choose between giv-
ing up my identity with "my thought," or the identity 
of myself with thought (presence). The Lacanian the-
sis, or experience, clearly exploits the lingering 
presence of the Cogito, and the coherence of his 
thought requires the paradoxical form. The Cogito must 
continue as the "outside" of Lacan1s texts, as that 
with which psychoanalysis is confronted, in order that 
the oppositions within psychoanalysis should produce a 
split subject, and not merely formal disintegrities of 
a system. 
We recall that Sartre viewed Freud as a theorist 
wholly in error, and even as laying the foundations for 
mauvaise foi. We may also note Sartre's absence from 
the discussions of the subject in present literature, 
to the point where his presence seems to undergo 
repression. 
What relations are we to say hold between the three 
splits in subjectivity that I have isolated here—the 
Sartrean division, focussed on self-deception; the 
Freudian, issuing from unconscious motivation (and 
identified in Lacan with the third); and the Derridean, 
glossed here as the "bar" in the sign. It can be 
argued,8 I think, that the first two can be super-
imposed, but that this requires us to abandon the 
third, that is, not read Freud as Lacan does. And here 
I wish to end by proposing something similar. 
I suggest that when we reread Sartre, after the in-
terval of Lacan and Derrida, we find a solution to the 
contradiction that we uncovered in the latters' 
writings. The following four features of Sartre's 
theory seem to me decisive: 
(l)Sartre provides a critique of the substantial 
conception of the unconscious on a par with Kant's cri-
tique of substantial selfhood. This gives us all we 
need to deny the duplication of the cogito at a second 
level; Lacan*s insistence on the unconscious as Other 
is superfluous (although I am glad to concede that it 
was necessary for Lacan to find some means of counter-
ing extant readings of Freud, with a richer conceptual 
apparatus). 
(2) Sartre works out the senses in which the uncon-
scious makes problematic consciousness in terms of fac-
ticity and transcendence, and thereby in terms of the 
failure and incompleteness of reflexivity. It is then 
an account which tells us how it is that the cogito 
fails in a way that makes that failure available for 
consciousness (so that I can say, "I fail of self-
knowledge" ). 
(3) The concepts of lack and nothingness do all 
that is done by talk of other and of the Other in 
Lacan, so that Sartre has as fully intersubjective an 
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account as could be required, and is not condemned to 
the problem of explaining how a solipsistic conscious-
ness could be split (as Husserl and perhaps Merleau-
Ponty would be, had they broached the question). 
(4) Derrida's critique of Husserlian self-presence 
is, in all essentials, already achieved in Sartre's The 
Transcendence of the Ego, in the treatment of the rela-
tion between thetic and non-thetic and reflective and 
non-reflective consciousness. Sartre there shows how 
reflectivity can secure a minimal, impoversihed self-
presence, from which self-knowledge proper is still at 
a great distance. No Illusions of self-access are 
grounded. 
In conclusion, we found that the attack on the 
classical subject, the Cogito, could be taken to such a 
point that its elimination yielded a re-unified 
entity—the person, an organism and object of empirical 
science, or the self-as-text, an expanse of signs. In 
this there was a transition from substantial unity to 
the unity of a system. In both the positivist order of 
physical facts, and the Derridean disorder of textual-
ity, the forsaking of consciousness involves a sacri-
fice of that tension which is required for what I have 
called a split subject. Both worlds are curiously 
flat, monotonous, inanimate. 
And so the choice as I see it lies between accept-
ing an intact and undivided cogito haunting a divided 
person, as we have in effect in Lacan; and rediscover-
ing Sartre to find all of the splits of selfhood con-
tained within a complexified and split cogito. I hope 
to have justified a preference for the latter, and 
thereby for according an oblique and qualified primacy 
to intentionality over signification.10 
NOTES 
*Does unity suffice for substantiality? The argu-
ment here is that, outside the framework of transcen-
dental idealism, we can only get a non-substantial 
unity by splitting the subject itself, and not by work-
ing from the arbitrary nature of the sign. 
2This is perhaps a deconstructive virtue of the 
text. In any case, it saves Sartre from the charge of 
having re-essentialised man by assigning to him a 
"passion inutile" with unitary content. 
JSee W. Sellars in ed. Lambert, "The Logical Way of 
Doing Things," Anscombe, "The First Person," S. 
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Shoemaker, 11 Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, " P. 
Kitcher in PR 1982. 
*Compare consciousness in the 1915 paper "The 
Unconscious," with remarks in New Introductory Lec-
tures. 
*Levi-Strauss, "The Savage Minds." 
'Speech and Phenomena. 
'Perhaps less capable of self-reference than are 
literary texts, that can at least refer to themselves 
on a single metonymic axis by the trope of synechdoche. 
'This must be qualified with the recognition that 
in "Freud and the Scene of Writing," Derrida does 
display an acute consciousness of the problem at hand, 
and sees it as propelling Freud's search for the 
"right" metaphor. 
'In a Ms, "Psychoanalysis and Self-Deception," I 
try to argue that this is possible, on the condition 
that we regard states of the Ucs. as "Unowned." 
1 01 would like to thank John and Cindy Willett-
Shoptaw and all others in Harvard's literary theory 
group for understanding and encouragement. 
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